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1 Introduction
A firm has several investment projects, and must make decisions such as investment, disinvest-
ment, abandonment, and capacity choice in these projects. The firm’s value and its exposure
to systematic risk, which are affected by uncertainty over the state of the economy and market
structure, are dependent on these decisions.
The previous works that analyze the relation between firms’ investment decision and their
asset return dynamics include Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003),
Kogan (2004), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), and Cooper (2006). The closest work on
the interaction among firms’ investment decisions and their asset return dynamics in a oligopolis-
tic market to this paper is Aguerrevere (2009). Aguerrevere (2009) shows that the link between
the degree of competition and the firms’ asset return dynamics varies with the market demand.
Specifically, Aguerrevere (2009) considers the firm that has an investment option and a option
to reduce capacity utilization when demand fall, that is, operating flexibility, and obtains the
result that is consistent with the empirical findings as Hou and Robinson (2006).
The firm’s decisions include not only investment and capacity change but also disinvestment
and exit. Especially, the disinvestment decision is one of the reasons for a change in the firm’s
capital stock. The firm can sell off capital stock to recover part of investment. There exist
several works with respect to the link between the firm’s disinvestment or exit decisions and its
asset return dynamics. Carlson et al. (2009) investigate risk dynamics in a duopolistic market
with asymmetric cost structure of firms. They find that for both investment and disinvestment
the increase in competition leads to risk reduction. Siyahhan (2009) analyzes the link between
firms’ exit decisions and risk dynamics in a duopolistic market, and finds that firm risk decreases
as the demand level approaches the exit threshold.
As shown in these previous works, firm’s decisions such as investment, disinvestment, and
capacity change affect their asset return. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the effect of
risk dynamics on the firm, which has these options, in competitive market. In this paper, we
investigate how the strategic behaviors of firms such as investment, disinvestment, operating
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flexibility affect their asset returns dynamics. Specifically, we use the model of the equilibrium
investment strategies of firms such as Baldursson (1998), Grenadier (2002), and Aguerrevere
(2003) to analyze firms’ decisions in competitive industries.
We first examine the case in which each firm has no disinvestment decision to compare our
approach with that of Aguerrevere (2009). We find that firms in more competitive industries
have a higher beta when demand is low, whereas firms in more concentrated industries have
a higher beta when demand is high. Hence, our results is similar to the result of Aguerrevere
(2009) that is derived by a different approach.
Then, we investigate the effect of competitive interaction among firms on asset returns
dynamics. We find that unlike Aguerrevere (2009), there are three regions as follows: a region
of low demand level in which increase in competition leads to lower risk, a region of middle
demand level in which increase in competition leads to higher risk, and a region of high demand
level in which increase in competition leads to lower risk. For the region of low demand level,
specifically, due to disinvestment option, increasing competition leads to reduce risk. This results
is consistent with that in Carlson et al. (2009).
Finally, we examine how uncertainty affects firms’ asset return dynamics. We find that the
region of middle demand level becomes small as uncertainty increases. This is because that the
effect of investment and disinvestment options becomes large due to increasing uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the setup of
model and derives the firm value and the expected returns. We then develop the model taking
into account the disinvestment and the operating flexibility. Section 3 provides some numerical
results with respect to the effect of competition in the market on the relation between firm’s
decisions and asset returns. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Setup
This paper extends the model of Grenadier (2002), who derives the equilibrium investment
strategies, and examines the effect of competition in the market on the relation between firms’
decisions such as investment and disinvestment, and their asset return.
Consider an industry composed of $n$ identical firms producing a single homogeneous good.
At time $t$ , firm $i$ produces $q_{t}^{i}$ units of output. We assume that the output price is given by the
inverse demand function as follows:
$P_{t}=X_{t}Q_{t}^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}$ , (1)
where $X_{t}$ is an exogenous shock to demand, $Q_{t}= \sum_{i}q_{t}^{i}$ is the industry output, and $\gamma>1$ is the
elasticity of demand. The evolution of the demand shock follows a geometric Brownian motion:
$dX_{t}=\mu X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}dW_{t}$ , $X_{0}=x$ , (2)
where $\mu$ is the instantaneous expected growth rate of $X_{t},$ $\sigma$ is the associated volatility, and $W_{t}$ is
a standard Brownian motion. Since all firms are identical, a symmetric equilibrium is considered
as follows:
$q_{t}^{i}= \frac{Q_{t}}{n}$ , $q_{t}^{-i}= \frac{(n-1)Q_{t}}{n}$ , (3)
where $q_{t}^{-i}$ is the output of all firms except firm $i$ , that is, $q_{t}^{-i}= \sum_{j=1,j\neq i}^{n}$ of.
Following Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) we assume that there exist traded assets
that can be used to hedge demand uncertainty in order to derive the firm value. Let $B_{t}$ denote
the price of a riskless asset with dynamics,
$dB_{t}=rB_{t}dt$ , (4)
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where $r$ is the constant risk-free rate of interest. We suppose that the price dynamics of the
risky asset is given by a geometric Brownian motion:
$dS_{t}=\eta S_{t}dt+\sigma S_{t}dW_{t}$ . (5)
The risky asset $S_{t}$ and the demand shock $X_{t}$ are perfectly correlated. We can use $B_{t}$ and $S_{t}$ to
construct a portfolio with $B_{t}$ and $S_{t}$ that exactly replicates the demand shock $X_{t}$ and derive its
risk neutral measure. Thus, the evolution of the demand shock under risk neutral measure is
given as follows:
$dX_{t}=(r-\delta)X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}d\hat{W}_{t}$ , (6)
where $\delta=\eta-\mu$ , and $\hat{W}_{t}=W_{t}+\frac{\eta-r}{\sigma}t$ .
Let $\pi^{i}(X_{t}, q_{t}^{i};Q_{t})$ denote the profit flow at time $t$ for firm $i$ . The profit flow can be represented
by the following equation:
$\pi^{i}(X_{t}, q_{t}^{i};Q_{t})=(P_{t}-c)q_{t}^{i}=X_{t}Q_{t}^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}q_{t}^{i}-cq_{t}^{i}$ , (7)
where $c$ is a constant cost flow. Furthermore, as in Aguerrevere (2009), the profit flow with
operating flexibility is given by
$\pi^{i}(X_{t}, q_{t}^{i};Q_{t})=\max 0\leq q_{t}^{i}\leq\underline{Q}n\perp[X_{t}Q_{t}^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}q_{t}^{i}-cq_{t}^{i}]$ (8)
The solution for the symmetric equilibrium assumption can be obtained by solving Eq. (8):
$\pi(x, Q)=\{\begin{array}{ll}(\frac{c}{n(n\gamma-1)})(\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma c}x)^{\gamma}, for x<\frac{n\gamma cQ^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{n\gamma-1},\frac{Q^{L^{-\underline{1}}}\gamma}{n}x-\frac{cQ}{n}, for x>\frac{n\gamma cQ^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{n\gamma-1}.\end{array}$ (9)
2.2 Firm Value in Competitive Equilibrium
At any time $t$ , each firm can invest in additional capacity to increase its output by an infinitesimal
increment $dq^{i}$ , and increases a output by incurring a cost of $I$ per unit of output. Firm’s
investment decisions affect the output price in Eq. (1), which is a function of the industry
output. Thus each firm can not ignore other firm’s investment decisions and is determined as
part of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Each firm chooses its discrete investment times $\tau_{\ell}^{i}$ at which
to increase its capacity $q_{\tau_{\ell}^{i}}^{i}$ for $\ell=1,2,$ $\cdots,$ $\infty$ to maximize the expected discounted value. The
value function for firm $i$ can then be represented by the following equation:
$V^{i}(x, q_{0}^{i}, q_{0}^{-i};q_{t}^{i}, q_{t}^{-i})=$ $\sup$ $E[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}[\pi^{i}(X_{t}, q_{t}^{i}, q_{t}^{-i})]dt-\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}Idq_{t}^{i}]$ (10)
$\{\tau_{\ell}^{i},q_{\tau_{\ell}^{i}}^{i}\}_{l=1}^{\infty}$
Following Grenadier (2002), we consider the symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium invest-
ment strategy as that of a myopic firm, which ignores competitive behavior. Although the de-
termination of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium in investment strategies becomes a complex problem,
due to this setting, the solution can be obtained by the standard framework. When the marginal
value of the symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium investment strategy for firm is $m(x, Q)$ , us-
ing the standard argument as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the following ordinary differential
equation, which is satisfied by the marginal value, can be derived:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}m’’+(r-\delta)xm’-7^{\cdot}m+\frac{\partial\pi}{\partial q^{i}}=0$ , (11)
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where
$\frac{\partial\pi}{\partial q^{i}}(x, Q)=\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}x-c$ . (12)
The general solutions of Eq. (11) are given as follows:
$m(x, Q)=a_{1}x^{\beta_{1}}+a_{2}x^{\beta_{2}}+ \frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}\frac{x}{\delta}-\frac{c}{r}$ , (13)
where $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ are unknown constants, and $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ are the positive and the negative roots,
respectively, of the characteristic equation $\frac{1}{2}\beta(\beta-1)+(r-\delta)\beta-r=0$ . The marginal value






$m(X^{*}(Q), Q)$ $=$ $I$ , (15)
$\frac{\partial m(X^{*}(Q),Q)}{\partial x}$ $=$ $0$ , (16)
where $X^{*}(Q)$ is the optimal investment threshold. Condition (14) requires that the option value
becomes zero if the demand is close to zero. Therefore, from this condition, we have $a_{2}=0$ .
Conditions (15) and (16) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, respectively.
From conditions (14-16), we can obtain the equilibrium value of a firm’s marginal investment as
follows:
$m(x, Q)=- \frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}\frac{v_{n}^{1-\beta_{1}}}{\beta_{1}\delta}Q^{-\lrcorner}\gamma x^{\beta_{1}}\beta+\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}\frac{Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{\delta}x-\frac{c}{r}$ , (17)
where
$v_{n}= \frac{\beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{n\gamma}{n\gamma-1}\delta(I+\frac{c}{r})$ . (18)
The equilibrium investment threshold is given by
$X^{*}(Q)=v_{n}Q^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}$ . (19)
Furthermore, following Grenadier (2002), we derive the value of each firm in equilibrium.
When the value of each firm in equilibrium is $V(x, Q)$ , the ordinary differential equation, which
is satisfied by the firm value, is derived as follows:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}V’’+(r-\delta)xV’-rV+\pi(x, Q)=0$ . (20)
The boundary condition for the firm value is given by
$\frac{\partial V(X^{*}(Q),Q)}{\partial Q}=\frac{I}{n}$ (21)
This condition (21) ensures that when the demand rises above the threshold $X^{*}(Q),$ $Q$ increases
by the infinitesimal increment $dQ$ , and the firm incurs a investment cost $\frac{I}{n}dQ$ . By solving
the differential equation (20) subject to the boundary condition (21), the value of each firm in
equilibrium can be obtained as follows:
$V(x, Q)=A(Q)x^{\beta_{1}}+ \frac{x}{n\delta}Q^{arrow-1}\gamma-\frac{cQ}{nr}$ , (22)
where
$A(Q)= \frac{v_{n}^{-\beta_{1}}}{n}\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-\beta_{1}}(I+\frac{c}{r}-\frac{v_{n}}{\delta}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma})Q^{\frac{\gamma-\beta}{\gamma}}$. (23)
A specific case with $c=0$ is the model of Grenadier (2002).
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2.3 Expected Returns
In this section, likewise Aguerrevere (2009), following Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004),
we derive the beta of firm $i$ .
From It\^o’s lemma and the evolution of the demand shock in Eq. (2), the instantaneous
change in $V$ is given by
$dV_{t}=[ \mu X_{t}\frac{dV_{t}}{dX_{t}}+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}X_{t}^{2}\frac{d^{2}V_{t}}{dX_{t}^{2}}]dt+\sigma X_{t}\frac{dV_{t}}{dX_{t}}dW_{t}$ , (24)
where
$\sigma_{V}\equiv\frac{\sigma X_{t}}{V_{t}}\frac{dV_{t}}{dX_{t}}$ , (25)
is the volatility of the firm value $V$ . When the expected return on the firm is $\mu_{V}$ , and the
covariance between the expected return on the firm and the market portfolio (risky assets) is




is the beta of the firm. Let $\rho_{VM}$ denote the the coefficient of correlation between the firm and
the market portfolio. $\sigma_{VM}$ can be rewritten as
$\sigma_{VM}=\rho_{VM}\sigma_{V}\sigma$ . (28)
Substituting Eqs. (25) and (28)into Eq. (27), the beta of the firm can be rewritten as follows:
$\beta=\rho_{VM}\frac{X_{t}}{V_{t}}\frac{dV_{t}}{dX_{t}}$ (29)
Since, as described above, the demand of the state variable and the market portfolio are perfectly
correlated, $\rho_{VM}=1$ . Therefore, the beta of firm can be represented as the elasticity of its market
value with respect to the demand:
$\beta=^{\underline{X_{t}}\underline{dV_{t}}}$ . (30)
$V_{t}dX_{t}$
By substituting (22) into (30), the beta of the firm, which consider the investment option to
increase its production capacity, can be obtained as follows:
$\beta(x, Q)=\frac{\beta_{1}A(Q)x^{\beta_{1}}+\frac{x}{n\delta-\gamma}Q^{\mapsto-1}\gamma}{A(Q)x^{\beta_{1}}+\frac{x}{n\delta}Q^{\mapsto 1}-\frac{cQ}{nr}}$. (31)
2.4 Investment, Disinvestment, and Operating Flexibility
In the previous section, the model for analyzing the beta of the firm that has the investment
option is presented. In this section, we consider the firm that has not only the investment
decision, but also disinvestment decision and operating flexibility.
The value function for firm $i$ taking into account investment and disinvestment decisions,
and operating flexibility is given by





where $A$ is a salvage value per unit capacity. Likewise the previous section, we consider the
marginal value of the symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium investment strategy. From Eq. (9)
the marginal profit flows is given by
$\frac{\partial\pi}{\partial q^{i}}(x, Q)=\{\begin{array}{ll}0, for x<\hat{X},\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}x-c, for x>\text{ },\end{array}$ (33)
where $\hat{X}=\frac{n\gamma cQ^{\frac{1}{1\gamma}}}{n\gamma-}$ . In the region where $x<\hat{X}$ , the ordinary differential equation, which is
satisfied by the marginal value, is derived as follows:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}m_{0’’}+(r-\delta)xm_{0’}-rm_{0}=0$. (34)
The general solutions of Eq. (34) are given as follows:
$m_{0}(x, Q)=B_{1}x^{\beta_{1}}+B_{2}x^{\beta_{2}}$ , (35)
$B_{1}$ and $B_{2}$ are unknown constants. In the region where $x>\hat{X}$ , the ordinary differential equation,
which is satisfied by the marginal value, is derived as follows:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}m_{1’’}+(r-\delta)xm_{1’}-rm_{1}+\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}x-c=0$ (36)
The general solutions of Eq. (36) are given as follows:
$m_{1}(X, Q)=B_{3}x^{\beta_{1}}+B_{4}x^{\beta_{2}}+ \frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma}\frac{Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{\delta}x-\frac{c}{r}$ (37)
$B_{3}$ and $B_{4}$ are unknown constants. The marginal value must satisfy the following boundary
conditions:
$m_{1}(\overline{X}, Q)$ $=$ $I$ , (38)
$\frac{\partial m_{1}}{\partial x}(\overline{X}(Q),$ $Q)$ $=$ $0$ , (39)
$m_{1}(\hat{X}, Q)$ $=$ $m_{0}(\hat{X}, Q)$ , (40)
$\frac{\partial m_{1}}{\partial x}(\hat{X},$ $Q)$ $=$ $\frac{\partial m_{0}}{\partial x}(\hat{X},$ $Q)$ , (41)
$m_{0}(\underline{X}, Q)$ $=$ $A$ , (42)
$\frac{\partial m_{0}}{\partial x}(\underline{X}(Q), Q)$ $=$ $0$ , (43)
where $\overline{X}(Q)$ and $\underline{X}(Q)$ is the optimal investment and disinvestment thresholds, respectively.
Conditions (38) and (39) are, respectively, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
that the marginal value must satisfy when the investment option is exercised. (40) and (41) are
boundary conditions in which $m_{0}(X, Q)$ and $m_{1}(X, Q)$ should have equal values and derivatives
because the function must be continuously differentiable across it. Conditions (42) and (43) are,
respectively, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the disinvestment option.
These six equations provide a simultaneous nonlinear equation system, which can be solved for
$B_{1},$ $B_{2},$ $B_{3},$ $B_{4)}\overline{X}$ , and $\underline{X}$ by means of a numerical calculation method. From these calculations,
the marginal value for each region, and the thresholds for investment and disinvestment can be
shown.
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Likewise, we derive the value of each firm in equilibrium. In the region where $x<\hat{X}$ , the
ordinary differential equation, which is satisfied by the firm value, is derived as follows:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}V_{0’’}+(r-\delta)xV_{0}’-rV_{0}+(\frac{c}{n(n\gamma-1)})(\frac{n\gamma-1}{n\gamma c}x)^{\gamma}=0$ (44)
The general solutions of Eq. (44) are given as follows:
$V_{0}(x, Q)=C_{1}(Q)x^{\beta_{1}}+C_{2}(Q)x^{\beta_{2}}+ \frac{(\frac{c}{\gamma(r-\delta n(n\gamma-1)})(\frac{n\gamma-1}{\gamma(\gamma n\gamma c}x)^{\gamma}}{r-)--1)\frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}}$ , (45)
where $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ are unknown constants. In the region where $x>\hat{X}$ , the ordinary differential
equation, which is satisfied by the firm value, is derived as follows:
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}V_{1’’}+(r-\delta)xV_{1}’-rV_{1}+\frac{Q^{\mapsto-1}\gamma}{n}x-\frac{cQ}{n}=0$ (46)
The general solutions of Eq. (46) are given as follows:
$V_{1}(x, Q)=C_{3}(Q)x^{\beta_{1}}+C_{4}(Q)x^{\beta_{2}}+ \frac{Q^{L^{-\underline{1}}}\gamma}{n\delta}x-\frac{cQ}{nr}$ , (47)
where $C_{3}$ and $C_{4}$ are unknown constants. The boundary condition for the firm value is given by
$\frac{\partial V_{1}}{\partial Q}(\overline{X}(Q),$ $Q)$ $=$ $\frac{I}{n}$ , (48)
$V_{1}(\hat{X}, Q)$ $=$ $V_{0}(\hat{X}, Q)$ , (49)
$\frac{\partial V_{1}}{\partial x}(\hat{X},$ $Q)$ $=$ $\frac{\partial V_{0}}{\partial x}(\hat{X},$ $Q)$ , (50)
$\frac{\partial V_{0}}{\partial Q}(\underline{X}(Q), Q)$ $=$ $\frac{A}{n}$ . (51)
We can obtain $C_{1}(Q),$ $C_{2}(Q),$ $C_{3}(Q)$ , and $C_{4}(Q)$ by solving numerically. The beta of firm that
has investment and disinvestment options, and operating flexibility can then be obtained as
follows:
$\beta(x, Q)=\{\begin{array}{l}\frac{x\partial V_{0}(x,Q)}{V_{0}(x,Q)\partial x}, for \underline{X}\leq x<\hat{X},\frac{x}{V_{1}(x,Q)}\frac{\partial V_{1}(x,Q)}{\partial x}, for \hat{X}<x\leq\overline{X}.\end{array}$ (52)
3 Numerical Analysis
In the previous section, we presented a model that enables the analysis of the asset retum dy-
namics of firm with investment and disinvestment options and operating flexibility in competitive
market. In the following section, we present the calculation results of asset return dynamics and
the effect of competition and uncertainty.
In Tab. 1, the base case parameters, which are used in the following analyses, are shown.
These base case parameter values are same values as in Aguerrevere (2009) except the salvage
value per unit of output, $A$ , to compare results in each model. Furthermore, likewise Aguerrevere
(2009), investment and disinvestment thresholds are independent of the number of firms in the
market. Thus the industry capacity $Q^{m}$ for $m$ of more than two is determined so that for each
number of firms investment and disinvestment thresholds are same values.
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Table 1: Base case parameters
In order to compare our approach with that of Aguerrevere (2009) that employs the firm’s
incremental investment approach as Pindyck (1988) and He and Pindyck (1992), we show the
result of a specific case in which the firm has no disinvestment option in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows the
effect of competition on the beta of the firm that has no disinvestment option for a monopoly, a
duopoly, a 5-firms oligopoly, a 10-firms oligopoly, and a 1000-firms oligopoly (perfect competi-
tion). Firms in more competitive industries have a higher beta when demand is low, while firms
in more concentrated industries have a higher beta when demand is high. Therefore, this results
is similar to the result of Aguerrevere (2009) that is derived by a different approach, and is also
is consistent with the empirical findings as Hou and Robinson (2006).
Fig. 2 shows the effect of competition on the beta of the firm for each number of firms. It
can be seen from Fig. 2 that there are three regions that compose of a region of low demand
level in which increase in competition leads to lower risk, a region of middle demand level in
which increase in competition leads to higher risk, and a region of high demand level in which
increase in competition leads to lower risk. A difference between our model and the model of
Aguerrevere (2009) lies in the existence of disinvestment decision. For the region of low demand
level, due to disinvestment option, increasing competition leads to reduce risk. This results is
X
Figure 1: Beta of the firm as a function of demand level for each number of firms. This case is
a specific case in which the firm has no disinvestment option.
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XFigure 2: Beta of the firm as a function of demand level for each number of firms. Each firm
has investment, disinvestment, operating flexibility.
consistent with that in Carlson et al. (2009) that for both investment and disinvestment the
increase in competition leads to risk reduction.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the effect of competition on the beta of the firm for $\sigma=0.1$ and 0.2,
respectively. As the volatility becomes large, the investment threshold increases and the disin-
vestment threshold decreases. This result is that of standard real options model as McDonald
and Siegel (1986) implies that investment and disinvestment decisions are deferred under uncer-
tainty. In addition, as shown in this figure, the region of middle demand level becomes small as
uncertainty increases. This is because that the effect of investment and disinvestment options
becomes large due to increasing uncertainty.
X X
Figure 3: Beta of the firm as a function of de- Figure 4: Beta of the firm as a function of de-
mand level for $\sigma=0.1$ . mand level for $\sigma=0.2$ .
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a model to analyze the effect of competition in the market
on the relation between firms’ decisions such as investment, disinvestment, and capacity change
and their asset return dynamics. We note first that although a model used in this study is
different from that of Aguerrevere (2009), our results is similar to the result of the previous
work. Second, for the relation between firm’s beta and demand level, there are a region of low
demand level in which increase in competition leads to lower risk, a region of middle demand
level in which increase in competition leads to higher risk, and a region of high demand level
in which increase in competition leads to lower risk. Finally, since the effect of investment and
disinvestment options becomes large due to increasing uncertainty, the region of middle demand
level becomes small as uncertainty increases.
The firm’s value and asset return would be dependent not only on its investment decisions,
but also its financing and capital structure. Therefore, extension of this study towards the asset
return of the firm with debt and equity financing would be warranted. Other directions for
future work in this area include the setting of competitive market with asymmetric firms, and
the inclusion of entry and exit decisions.
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